The feeling of being the source and controller of one's actions and their effects in the outside world is an important aspect of our sense of self. Disturbances in this sense of agency (SoA) were observed in schizophrenia and have been linked to impairments in sensorimotor integration. We used a virtual-world action-monitoring paradigm to investigate the SoA in 20 schizophrenic patients and 18 healthy subjects. Participants continuously moved a virtual pen displayed on a computer screen using a touchpad device. The control they exceeded over the virtual pen was switched periodically between the participant and the computer. Participants were requested to monitor their actions and the effects on the virtual pen, and indicate loss or regain of control over the pen's movement by button presses. The numbers of erroneous external attribution of action effects (false negative agency judgements) and erroneous self-attribution (false positive agency judgements) were not significantly different in patients and healthy subjects. However, patients showed a significant increase in the duration of false negative agency judgements. Moreover, the number of false negative agency judgements as well as the number and the duration of false positive agency judgements were negatively correlated with the performance in cognitive tests (BACS) in the patient group only. Our findings indicate that the evaluation system to detect a mismatch between actions and their effects in the outside world is probably more rigid in schizophrenic patients, which leads to an increased self-attribution bias for action effects, as commonly found in delusions of control. The impairment in sensorimotor integration may be compensated for by stronger cognitive control.
Introduction
In our daily life we constantly perform goal-directed actions, and even though we usually do not reflect upon them, we normally experience them as self-initiated. This feeling of being the agent of our own actions and knowing "that I am the one who is causing an action" has been described as "the sense of agency" (SoA), Gallagher, 2000) .
Recent computational theories provide a theoretical account for the underlying mechanisms that may constitute the SoA. Models of sensorimotor prediction (Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Bays and Wolpert, 2007) suggest that internal signals generated by voluntary movement (re-afferences; von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950) are processed differently from signals of external origin and sensory input is cancelled or attenuated based on motor command signals (Voss et al., 2006 (Voss et al., , 2008 . In brief, a forward model predicts the sensory consequences of current motor output, and compares this prediction with actual sensory input. Importantly, conscious perception reflects only the error generated by this comparison, since there is no need to perceive what can already be predicted (Blakemore et al., 1998) . It has been suggested that prediction based on efference copy may be compromised in schizophrenia (e.g. Frith and Done, 1989; Lindner et al., 2005) . Accordingly, positive symptoms such as delusions of control may occur because the comparator lacks a predictive input (Blakemore et al., 2002) . The comparator model therefore predicts a reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia -as found in delusions of control. Surprisingly, this is at odds with a number of findings. For example, several studies asked patients to identify explicitly whether a visual signal corresponded to an action they had just made or not (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Fourneret et al., 2002; Farrer et al., 2004; Knoblich et al., 2004) . All studies show that in such situations, where visual feedback of an action is distorted, patients are more likely than controls to identify an action as their own. Patients tend to perceive actions as their own, or originating internally, rather than externally as comparator theories would predict. Comparator models can therefore not entirely explain excessive agency in schizophrenia.
In extension of the comparator-model, Synofzik et al. (2008) suggested a two-factor account of agency, in which a low-level "feeling" of agency is contrasted with a higher level "judgement" of agency. The feeling of agency (FoA) is conceptualised as a fundamental sense of being an agent of an action and depends mainly on the coherence of motor and sensory cues and its temporal relationship. While the FoA remains implicit, the so-called judgment of agency (JoA) comprises a more cognitive, higher order agency attribution. Based on the integration of complex cognitive cues such as contextual and social cues, prior expectations or core beliefs, an explicit conceptual, interpretative judgement of being the agent of an action is made (Synofzik et al., 2008) . The influence of additional cues on the JoA-level may explain the above-mentioned contradiction; the self-attribution bias commonly observed in schizophrenia patients could then be seen as a strong cognitive influence, possibly to compensate for increased uncertainty.
Cue-integration approaches (Synofzik et al., 2009; Synofzik and Voss, 2010; Moore and Fletcher, 2011) may give a clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or compete with, each other to form a SoA. Moore and Feltcher (2011) suggested a Bayesian integrative framework, including not only actual, transient internal and external cues, but also more stable priors about the most probable outcome of an action. Synofzik et al. (2013) pointed out the interplay between predictive and retrospective information within this cue integration process, while keeping the distinction between FoA and JoA in mind.
In the present study, we created an experiment, in which participants continuously had to report their subjective agency experience while controlling a virtual pen, similar to controlling a cursor on a screen via a computer mouse. Since visual feedback was de-coupled from participant's hand movements in unpredictable intervals, we created a situation of constant ambiguity with respect to the basic feeling of agency (FoA). However, since the FoA is a low-level, implicit experience, and therefore a direct measure of the FoA is not possible, we forced our participants continuously into an explicit judgement about their agency experience. Importantly, we were able to examine two different situations that occurred during the course of the experiment: in one situation, participants felt that they were in control of the virtual pen, although in fact the pen's movements on the screen were independent of the participant's hand movements (false positive agency judgement). In the other situation, participants were in fact controlling the virtual pen with their hand movements but were not aware of it (false negative agency judgement). The total number and the duration of such false positive of false negative judgements could be compared between the groups (patients suffering from schizophrenia and healthy subjects) and correlations with psychopathology measures and measures of cognitive performance could be computed. We were therefore able to investigate the potential influence of factors such as psychopathology or cognitive performance on judgements of agency (JoA) in health and disease.
Methods

Subjects
Twenty patients with schizophrenia (paranoid subtype; Sz) and a group of 18 age-, gender-and education-matched healthy subjects were included in the study. Paranoid schizophrenia and other Axis-I psychiatric disorders were diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and International Classification of Diseases 10 (World Health Organization, 2008) . Patients with comorbid Axis-I diagnoses were excluded from the study. Healthy subjects were screened for Axis-I and Axis-II psychiatric disorders using the MiniInternational Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I, (Ackenheil et al., 1999) ) and excluded whenever signs of such a disorder were detected.
The psychopathology of the patient group was assessed with the scales for the assessment of positive and negative symptoms (SAPS (Andreasen, 1984) and SANS (Andreasen, 1983) , respectively) by two experienced psychiatrists. Patients were recruited from the Department of Psychiatry, Charité -Universitätsmedizin Berlin. As a measure of cognitive performance, the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS (Keefe et al., 2004) ) was used. Sociodemographic data, drug information as well as performance in BACS and SAPS and SANS are depicted in Table 1 . Drug doses are expressed as Chlorpromazine equivalent (Woods, 2003; Andreasen et al., 2010) . We obtained written-informed consent from all participants before the start of the experiment. The local Ethics committee of the Charité University Hospital, Berlin, approved the study.
Experimental setup
We used a virtual reality (VR) environment, programmed in presentation control language (version 0.71; Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Albany, CA). The VR consisted of a photo-realistic virtual representation of a desk; a touchpad device and a pen. Participants sat in front of a computer screen displaying the VR. The touchpad device, the pen as well as a computer keyboard were placed below an extensible shelf to ensure that only the virtual but not real movements were to be observed. The task was to move the pen on the touchpad device in self-paced random movements along four patches that were located at the surface of the virtual touchpad device in a rectangular shape (see Fig. 1 ).
Experimental course
The experiment consisted of two conditions: the sense of agency task as the experimental condition as well as a reaction time task as a control condition. At the beginning of an experimental session, participants were familiarized with the setting (~4 min). Subsequently, four experimental blocks, each of them containing three sense of agency tasks and one reaction time task, were performed.
Sense of agency task
The ongoing movements of the virtual pen were controlled either by the participant or the computer and continuously switched from one to the other every 7 -14s. Participants were instructed to detect transitions as fast as possible by releasing (loss of control) or pressing (regain of control) the space bar of a computer keyboard. To provide a continuous motor process and an adequate task difficulty, changes between both periods were kept as smooth as possible. During periods with control the motion of the real pen was continuously recorded and stored with a sampling frequency of 60 Hz. As soon as the duration of controlled motion was ≥7 s and the current motor vector was comparable to one of the stored motor vectors within a tolerance of ±5 degree and a Euclidean distance within a tolerance of 2 millimetres, the control was withdrawn by re-playing the stored pen movement regardless of the participants' actual movements ( Fig. 2A) .
In order to ensure a smooth transition back to controlled motion, the distance between virtual and real pen was successively reduced within the last second of the period without control (see Supplementary Material Formula 1). Thus, the frequency of changes between periods with and without control was about 9 s (average durations: periods with control = 9.04 ± 1.16 s; periods without control = 8.96 ± 1.15 s). If participants lifted the pen before they reached the end of the task, the task was repeated.
Reaction time task
Patients were instructed to make self-paced random movements along the four patches located on the touchpad's surface (see Fig. 1 ). A coloured dot on the pen's tip changed its colour every 7 -14 s from red to green and backwards again. Participants were requested to indicate this change by pressing or releasing the space bar.
Parameter extraction
Since we used a self-paced motion task, participants were likely to differ in their general motor behaviour. This might cause interferences between general motor and SoA specific effects. For example, changes in control to a slow, temporally and spatially constant and smooth motion trajectory are much harder to detect than those appearing in temporally and spatially fast changing rough trajectories. We therefore quantified individual motor parameters for each participant and used selected parameters to address this issue in the sense of agency parameter analysis.
Motor parameters
Based on the individual trajectories from the SoA task, we computed the mean trajectory velocity and the variability of the trajectory velocity as a measure of motion stability (see Supplementary material Formula 2). To quantify the shape of the trajectory we computed the mean of the absolute inverse curvatures for each waypoint (see Fig. 2 Panel B and Supplementary material Formula 3). This value served as an estimate for the mean radius of the drawn circles. Furthermore, we assessed the smoothness of the trajectory by computing the ratio between the path lengths of the original and the temporally low pass filtered trajectory (cut off frequency = 10 Hz).
Finally, we divided the tablet in 42 × 30 grid squares with a side length of 5 mm and computed the condition specific probability the pen was within a certain square (see Supplementary material Formula 4). The resulting probability fields were averaged for both groups and represent overall motion behaviour ( Fig. 2 Panel C) .
By means of these motor parameters, we tested differences in general motor behaviour between groups and conditions in order to control for confounding effects.
Sense of agency parameters
Switches in SoA as indicated by participants agency judgements were differentiated into those (i) related to actual losses of control 2 and (ii) those occurring irrespectively of actual changes of control (false negative agency judgements or false positive agency judgements). For event class (i) we estimated the latency for each agency judgement by subtracting the individual mean reaction time (as obtained from the subsequent reaction time task) from these response times. Thus, task unspecific differences in individual motor skills and also potential vigilance induced drifts in response speed could be taken into account. Secondly, for these trajectory points we computed the mean Euclidean distances between real and virtual pen as well as the mean angular disparities between the movement vectors (see Fig. 2 Panel A & B and Supplementary material Formula 5). For event class (ii) we analysed the mean number as well as the mean duration of false negative agency judgements and false positive agency judgements per task block. To minimize effects of learning, motivation and vigilance, the first and the last SoA block were excluded from analysis.
Inference statistics
For motor parameters, 2-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) for repeated measures with the factors GROUP (Sz/HC) and CONDITION (control/no control) were performed separately for the motion velocity, the variability of trajectory velocity, the inverse curvature of the trajectory, the trajectory smoothness, and each grid square of the probability field.
For SoA parameters, one-way Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) with the factor GROUP (Sz/HC) and the covariates variability of trajectory, mean inverse trajectory curvature and trajectory smoothness were performed for the estimated time point of switch of SoA (only losses), the Euclidean distance between trajectories (real and virtual) and the angular disparity between the movement vectors at this time point as well as the absolute number of false negative agency judgements, the absolute number of false positive agency judgements and the mean durations participants remained in this states. Only temporally and spatially variable measures were chosen for covariation, because, due to the algorithm we used for this paradigm, these parameters were the ones most likely to affect the results of the SoA task. In contrast, temporally and spatially stable measures, such as the mean velocity, should have no impact on the results.
Associations between SAPS, SANS and BACS sum scores and the SoA parameters were assessed by partial correlation analysis with the same covariates as described for the ANCOVAS. If one group showed a significant correlation, we tested for significant between group differences in correlation by estimating the 95% confidence intervals of correlation coefficients of both groups by means of bootstrapping.
The significance threshold was set to a value of p = .05, Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. Only results passing this threshold were considered for discussion.
2 This was due to the different algorithms used for the two transition types. The algorithm used for regain of control produced a much less smoother transition from the period without control to the periods with control. Thus, losses and regains of control were not comparable events. That's why we decided to exclude the regain of control events from analysis. All computations and statistical analyses were performed using Matlab R2010b (Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA) and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS V20, IBM Corp., Armonk, NY).
Results
Motor parameters
Two way ANOVAs revealed only significant main effects for the factor group for all motor parameters: independent of the actual control state, patients moved the pen significantly slower (mean velocity: p b .001) but more temporally constant (SD velocity: p b .001) than healthy subjects. Moreover, patients' trajectories were significantly narrower (mean inverse curvature: p b .001) and tended to be less smooth (mean smoothness: p = .037, but not significant in post-hoc t-test). Patients showed also significantly slower response speed compared to healthy subjects (mean release time: p = .013).
The grid-wise analysis of motion probability fields showed only significant differences between the condition specific fields. No main effect group or an interaction could be detected.
There was no significant correlation between any of the motor parameters and Chlorpromazine equivalents (see Tables 2 and 3) . The trajectory of the virtual pen is displayed as dashed red line (upper two graphs). In the lower graph, the state of real control is displayed as solid and an exemplary SoA course is displayed as dashed black line. Periods of false negative agency judgement (fp) and false positive agency judgement (fp) are highlighted. Panel B shows the same trajectory in plane. Please note the smooth transition after the change in control as indicated by a triangle. The time point/position of participants' response is highlighted by a circle and the time point/position of the estimated switch of judgement is indicated by a square. In panel B also the Euclidean distance (ED) and the angular disparity (AD) as well as the geometrical meaning of the inverse trajectory curvature (radius r j of the best fitting circle for trajectory point [x j ,y j ]) are shown. Panel C shows the mean normalized motion probability fields separated for group and condition. The normalization was done by means of chance probability P Chance . Thus, for a value of five, denote a probability of five times greater than chance. Beside the mean probability fields, the post-hoc t-test for the only significant main effect of group is shown (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). Abbreviations: Sz -group of schizophrenic patients; HC -healthy control group; r -release; p -press; y -yes; n -no.
3.2. SoA parameters (adjusted for differences in motor behaviour, see 2.5)
Group differences
Separate one-way ANCOVAS revealed a significant group difference for the mean duration of false negative agency judgements . Post-hoc t-test showed a strong tendency (see Tables 2 and 3 , Fig. 3 ).
Correlations with psychopathology and cognitive performance
There were no significant correlations between the sum scores as taken from SAPS and SANS and the SoA parameters within the Sz group.
The BACS sum score was significantly negatively correlated with the number of false negative agency judgements and the number as well as the mean duration of false positive agency judgements in schizophrenic patients but not in healthy subjects. In healthy subjects only the mean Euclidean distance at the estimated time point of each agency judgement was correlated with the BACS sum score. Subsequent bootstrapping revealed a distinct 95% confidence interval for the correlation between BACS and the number of false negative agency judgements. No distinct 95% confidence interval was found for the other group specific correlation coefficients (Table 4) .
Discussion
We investigated factors contributing to agency judgements in schizophrenic patients and a group of healthy subjects using a novel visuomotor task. By forcing participants into continuous monitoring of their actions and explicit agency judgements, we created a situation of constant uncertainty with respect to the match between participants' actions and the visual feedback.
Importantly, the experimental design allowed us to distinguish two kinds of erroneous agency attributions and observe potential influences of cognitive factors or psychopathological traits on such attribution errors: (1) Erroneous self-attribution despite an actual mismatch of visual feedback and actual hand movements (false positive agency judgement) and (2) erroneous external attribution despite an actual Abbreviations: Sz -group of schizophrenic patients; HC -healthy control group; SD -standard deviation,; RT -reaction time; SoA -Sense of Agency Table 3 Motor and sense of agency parameters -inference statistics. SoA statistics adjusted for motor parameters. Significant differences are highlighted with gray. ME group ME condition Interaction match between actual movements and visual feedback (false negative agency judgement). Interestingly, patients and healthy subjects differed only in one of these possible misattribution errors: The duration of false negative agency judgements was significantly prolonged in patients suffering from schizophrenia (while the number of such false negative agency judgements did not differ between groups). For false positive agency judgements, we found no difference between groups. This result differs from a number of previous studies which mostly found that schizophrenic patients are generally more prone to attribute agency to themselves in a highly ambiguous environment (Daprati et al., 1997; Fourneret et al., 2002; Knoblich et al., 2004; Hauser et al., 2011) . In their review of 2011, Moore and Fletcher suggested that there might be a general tendency to attribute agency to oneself under conditions of uncertainty (Moore and Fletcher, 2011) . Recently, Ferri et al. (2012) found that first-episode schizophrenia patients showed a higher number of self-misattribution errors, possibly due to having access to less discriminative information for self-recognition than healthy subjects.
Despite such evidence from previous studies, the result of our study may not be as surprising as it seems at the first glance: Erroneous external agency attributions in our setup occurred during phases in which the discrepancies between motor signals and sensory feedback actually did not differ. False negative agency judgements must have been caused by transient, spontaneous errors in sensorimotor integration, which then led to a false agency attribution. Such errors did not occur significantly more often in patients compared to healthy subjects, but patients did not correct them as quickly as healthy subjects and stayed longer in the false belief that they were not in control of the pen.
On the contrary, in the case of false positive agency judgements, a judgement error occurred despite a large mismatch between internal motor signals and visual feedback. Such large discrepancies between Fig. 3 . Results of SoA parameter analysis. Significant group differences (Panel A), partial correlations between SoA parameters and BACS sum score and probability density functions of correlation coefficients (Panels B & C) as obtained from bootstrap analyses (999 bootstrap operations per group and parameter). The 95% CI for the bootstrapped correlation coefficients are overlaid on the density plots. All SoA parameters were adjusted for motor parameters (mean variability in trajectory velocity, mean inverse trajectory curvature and mean trajectory smoothness). Table 4 Partial correlation between BACS sum score and Sense of Agency parameters Significant differences are highlighted with gray. internal motor signals and external feedback seemed to be detectable for both patients and healthy subjects alike -there were no significant differences in number or duration of false positive agency judgements. These results support the theory, that patients suffering from schizophrenia rely less on (possibly imprecise) internal sensorimotor predictions and use external sensory (i.e. visual) feedback more strongly to make judgements about agency Voss et al., 2010 , for a review see Synofzik et al., 2013) : While there seems to be no difficulty to detect large discrepancies between action and visual feedback, transient disruptions in sensorimotor integration led to significantly longer durations of false negative agency judgements. Furthermore, the situation of false negative agency judgements resembles somewhat a symptom commonly observed in patients suffering from schizophrenia: delusions of alien control, in which own movements do not feel self-generated anymore. In contrast to patients, where internal signals predicting agency are corrupted by noise (Moore and Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010) , the sensorimotor system in healthy subjects seems capable of compensating such errors more rapidly (Malenka et al., 1982; Frith and Done, 1989; Stirling et al., 1998) .
Sz
Another core finding in our study is a correlation between cognitive measures as reflected in the BACS sum score with performance in the sensorimotor task. The number of false negative agency judgements as well as the number and the duration of false positive agency judgements were negatively correlated with the performance in cognitive tests (BACS) in the patient group only. In other words -less cognitive impairment led to a lower number of agency misattributions. This strongly suggests an influence of top down processes on the sensorimotor level integrating additional cues or strategies to evaluate the current state of SoA. Such additional cognitive cues could be used to "override" transient (and potentially noisy) integrations from the sensorimotor system alone and therefore make the agency judgements more reliable. The fact that subsequent bootstrapping showed a significant difference of the 95% confidence intervals only for the correlation between BACS and the number of false negative agency judgements might suggest a disease independent general effect of cognitive functioning on SoA, albeit less pronounced and not significant in healthy subjects. Only in schizophrenic patients compensatory effects driven by cognitive performance seem to become relevant.
Another finding that stresses the potential influence of cognitive functioning on agency judgements is the positive correlation between BACS sum score and the mean Euclidean distance at the estimated time point of switch of SoA. This finding may suggest that higher cognitive functioning leads to an adjustment of the criterion (Euclidean distance) to make a judgement of agency in a situation of uncertainty.
To our knowledge, no study before reported associations between behavioural measures related to the SoA and cognitive performance in a group of schizophrenic patients. Our findings support the hypothesis that the alterations seen in the patient group are the result of an impaired and more rigid integration mechanism, which is more errorprone due to the strong reliance on external rather than internal cues. Patients with greater cognitive resources may be able to better compensate for deficits in this process in highly ambiguous situations.
In contrast to previous studies (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Fourneret et al., 2002; Schnell et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2010) we did not find a correlation between behavioural measures (SoA parameters) in our task and psychopathology of the patients collective. This could be partially explained by the fact that, due to the complexity of our task, we could only include highly functional patients. Furthermore, Delevoye-Turrell et al. (2002) showed that performance on a basic sensorimotor level does not differ between delusional and not delusional patients. The authors suggest that the problem of imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of one's own actions rather lies on a higher cognitive level.
Differences in motor behaviour between patients and healthy subjects are in line with previous reports showing impoverished motor behaviour in schizophrenia (e.g. Cadenhead et al., 1997; Jogems-Kosterman et al., 2001 ). In line with Schwartz et al. (1989 Schwartz et al. ( , 1991 we found also a decrease in reaction speed. Together, this could lead to artificial findings (e.g. a SoA independent prolongation of response times). Keeping this in mind, we adjusted all SoA parameters for variability in trajectory velocity, trajectory curvature and trajectory smoothness.
In summary, our data suggest that patients with schizophrenia exhibit a less flexible and more rigid judgment of agency. Higher overall cognitive functioning might alleviate this impairment. We argue that sensorimotor integration is a constantly ongoing process with frequently updated judgements that are highly influenced by cognitive control. Our results strengthen the role of such cognitive elements and might help deepening the understanding of selfattribution bias in patients with schizophrenia.
Role of funding source
This work was supported by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation (VW II/85 067). The funding source had no further role in study design; in the collection analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report; and in the decision to submit the paper for publication.
Contributors
Authors JDW, TW and MV designed the study. Authors JDW and KT recruited the participants and performed the experiment. Authors JDW and TW analysed the data. Authors JDW, TW and MV wrote the manuscript. All authors contributed to interpretation of the results and have contributed to and approved the final manuscript.
Conflict of interest statement
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
